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III. 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant complains that Plaintiff has not provided this Court with the District Court 
opinion transcript. Plaintiff responds that this Court has the complete record, primarily affidavits 
of both parties, necessary to determine for itself whether the District Court erred. This is akin to 
a trial de novo. Plaintiff alleges that the District Court did not construe facts liberally in favor of 
Plaintiff, contrary to the standard on summary judgment. Boiled down to its essence, 
Defendant' s Response Brief consists of four failed arguments. All are unsupported by existing 
law. 
IV. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY ARGUMENT 
1. 'Due diligence' does not mean hiring a private investigator. 
Defendant wishes this Corni adopt a new standard of due diligence. This standard is that 
upon Plaintiff's failure to find Defendant who has explicitly provided a false address to state 
officials, a Plaintiff must 1) always hire a private investigator to find Defendant; 2) it must also 
use a skip trace service; and 3) Plaintiff must spend at least two full days in the search. And, 
there is no exception to this "new" rule including evasion of service. (Respondent's Brief p. 12) 
Interestingly, Defendant utilized a skip trace service based in Colorado and an 
investigator based in Salmon, Idaho (R, p . 118), choices which Defendant's insurer, Farm 
Bureau, must have utilized in the past. It selected not to duplicate an online computer search, but 
rather, only enlist the help of vendors. R, p. 108, 109 There is no case law to support this 
standard. 
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Contrary to this proposed standard, Idaho still uses a 'totality of circumstances' test in 
Harrison v. Ed. Of Prof'! Discipline of Idaho State Board of Med. 145 Idaho 179, 183; 177 P .3d 
393 (2008), to include a 'failure to act within six months' factor in Harrison v. Board of Prof'/ 
Discipline; and a 'legitimate reason' factor in Nerco Minerals Co. v Morrison Knudsen Corp. , 
132 Idaho 531, 534; 976 P .2d 457 (1999) when addressing good cause. 
As to legitimate reason, Plaintiff reminds the Court that Defendant submitted three 
affidavits to support his position that he was not served. Not once did he deny that his stated 
address was in Firth, Idaho. Not once did he deny that he blatantly ignored three Idaho Code 
provisions in providing an accurate address to: 1) Idaho Department of Motor Vehicles, 2) 
Bingham County Vehicle Registration Depaiiment when registering his 2008 GMC truck (the 
one involved in the crash) after he moved from his Fi1ih address in 2009 in the registration 
renewal years in 2010 - 2014; and 3) Investigating Officer Barker on May 24, 2014. In that 
exchange with Officer Barker, Defendant specifically violated LC. § 18-8007(1 )( c) which states: 
The driver of any vehicle that has been involved in an accident 
... who knows or has reason to know that that said accident 
has resulted in injury of any person ... shall: .... give his 
name, address, and the name of his insurance agent or company 
... to the person struck ... or to the person attending any 
vehicle collided with. (Emphasis added) 
Because Defendant did not speak with Plaintiff directly at the accident scene, he provided 
his address through an intermediary which was Officer Barker. Officer Barker then passed this 
information to Plaintiff in the Collision Report. All of these due process statutes converge to 
form a ' starting point' for service of process, to occur within six months after filing the 
complaint. In other words, to serve the complaint Plaintiff must start somewhere to locate 
Defendant. According to Plaintiffs Process Server, Marc Jorgenson, this is normally at the 
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address listed in the police report which is taken from a driver license and/or proof of registration 
which is computer verified by the Department of Motor Vehicles. R, p. 141 - 143 
2. Defendant's skip trace 'experiment' was flawed and is irrelevant. 
Defendant constructed a skip trace ' experiment' in an effort to illustrate the relative ease 
of finding Defendant. But he does not convey the whole story of how his insurance company, 
Farm Bureau, located Defendant at his Hickory Comi address. It appears Defendant had access 
to and used Defendant's social security number in this search. Plaintiff directs the Court to 
Record p. 115 where it will find on the repo1i the words and numbers: "Verifiers: 
Also, Defendant's vendors were supplied with a new insured name, "Pamela 
White," who is not listed in the Police Report. R, p. 47-53 This means the skip trace service 
probably had some access to this information, likely in Farm Bureau' s file. How else could they 
get it as it was not in the Police Report? Plaintiff argues that this critical piece of information 
provides a substantial advantage in a search and one rarely if ever obtained by a plaintiff trying 
to locate a defendant. 
No doubt, Farm Bureau Ins. Co. had a copy of Plaintiff's Summons and Complaint in 
hand at the Idaho Falls Farm Bureau office on November 8, 2016, all within the six month 
service time parameters. This is proof that Plaintiff did act to serve within six months. This 
uncontested fact was put forth by Plaintiff in the Affidavit of Kristen Walker, Plaintiff's legal 
assistant: "On November 8, 2016 ... Mr. Pincock informed me that Farm Bureau already had a 
copy of the complaint and summons because Natalie White had delivered it to their office." 
Accordingly, she thought Farm Bureau had accepted service. R, p. 73 It follows that Ms. White 
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notified Defendant who instructed her to take it there. Thus, Defendant had actual notice of the 
complaint within the six month time parameter. 
Finally, and importantly, even Defendant's professional grade skip trace and private 
investigator results were inaccurate. The finished product was delivered to Farm Bureau on 
January 11, 2017 with a claim that: "The subject, Gary Eugene White has relocated from the 
provided address in Firth, ID and is currently residing in at the following address: 3640 Hickory 
Court in Idaho Falls, Idaho." R, p. 115 Yet, according to Defendant' s own affidavit he had 
already moved to Mesquite, Nevada three months earlier in October of 2016. R, p. 156 In truth, 
what this search found was Defendant's former address on Hickory Court. 
The same holds true for investigator Lansing who on April 11, 2017 attested "Within two 
days [I] was able to locate Mr. White's current address at 3640 Hickory Ct. Idaho Falls, ID." R, 
p. 11 7 But a knock on the door would show that Defendant was not at that address. 
If anything, this experiment stands for the proposition that Defendant was difficult to find 
and 'on the move. ' This is precisely the problem that Plaintiff faced. Even Defendant' s son and 
daughter-in-law stated that Defendant's address was unknown or possibly in Nevada. 
In review of the record, this skip trace and private investigator experiment was the only 
"new evidence" -- inaccurate as it was -- which Defendant presented in his Motion for 
Reconsideration. R, p. 82 This somehow changed the District Court's mind from its previous 
correct finding that Plaintiff had showed good cause. 
In retrospect, this evidence should not have been considered at all and is irrelevant, as 
the correct analysis was to be Plaintiffs attempt to serve Defendant within six months, not 
Defendant's search thereafter. According to the holding in A1artin v. Hoblit, 133 Idaho 372, 375, 
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987 P.2d 284 (1999): "The focus of the good cause inquiry is on the six-month time period 
following the filing of the complaint." 
3. Hincks v. Neilson has striking factual differences to the case_ at bar. 
The Defendant leans heavily on Hincks v. Neilson , 13 7 Idaho 610, 51 P .3d 424 (2002) as 
the superior precedent in Idaho, urging this Court to use it as a template for 'due diligence' 
(Respondent's Brief p. 20). Upon scrutiny however, Hincks v. Neilson is not similar, much less 
I 
identical, to the case at bar. 
First, in Hincks, the Court of Appeals in upholding a motion to grant summary judgment 
on Plaintiffs failure to show good cause for lack of service contains no finding that the address 
Defendants had provided to the investigating police officer were in any way falsified or 
inaccurate. Id. at 611 
And second, in Hincks there was no evidence presented to the District Court that there 
was any attempt by Plaintiff to serve the summons and complaint within six months. All 
evidence indicated that the search occuned after the six month period: 
Caesar' s affidavit provided no specific dates for when these 
attempts took place to show that they occurred within the 
six-month period and Hincks provided no information about 
any actions she or her counsel personally took during the 
six-month time period following August 3, 1999. Id. at 613 
In contrast, the case at bar is one of first impression. Plaintiff has presented a new fact 
pattern not addressed in any cases that she has researched in the State of Idaho or elsewhere 
regarding the falsification of Defendant ' s address in a face to face meeting with the investigating 
officer. Officer Barker' s affidavit stands unrefuted in that no other resident address, other than at 
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Firth, was reflected on Defendant's license or registration. Officer Barker also testified by way of 
affidavit that, "I also asked Defendant and he said this [Firth address] was his address." R, p. 34 
4. Equity requires a reversal. 
Finally, though certainly not necessary considering the facts here, an equitable remedy is 
permissible and can be raised at any time in any proceeding either at the district or appellate 
level to remedy a wrong. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 1 (b) - Scope of Rules includes the notion 
of equity in all proceedings: 
These rules govern the procedure and apply uniformly in the 
district courts and magistrate divisions of the district courts in 
the state of Idaho in all actions, proceedings and appeals of a 
civil nature whether cognizable as cases at law or in equity ... 
(Emphasis added) 
Also, Idaho Appellate Rule 17(f) - Issues states: 
A notice of appeal shall include substantially the following 
information: A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal 
which the appellant then intends to assert in the appeal; 
provide any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent 
the appellant from presenting any other issues on appeal. 
Though ' equitable estoppel ' is not listed as an issue under this such title, Plaintiff has 
raised the issue of ' evasion of service ' specifically referenced as a ' good cause ' exception in 
Harrison v. Bd. Of Prof'! Discipline of Idaho State Board of Jvled. , 145 Idaho 179, 183 ; 177 P.3d 
393 (2008) citing Jvlartin v. Hobli( 133 Idaho 372, 375, 377, 987 P.2d 284 (1999): 
DOCKET 45185 
There is no bright line test in determining whether good 
cause exists ... If a plaintiff fails to make any attempt at 
service within the time period of the rule, it is likely that a 
court will find no showing of good cause ... Courts also 
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look to factors outside of the plaintiffs control including ... 
evasion of service of process. (Emphasis added) 
Thus, Defendant's false statements as to his address constitutes evasion and accordingly 
Defendant should be estopped from asse1iing a defense of failure to serve. 
Further dissecting the 'good cause' determination on an equitable level , James William 
Moore ' s, 1 Moore's Federal Practice, vol. 1, § 4.82, 4.83 (3d. ed, LexisNexis 2017 update) 
states: 
[Elven without a showing of good cause, courts have discretion to 
grant additional time to complete service .... Id. at § 4.82 While 
under Rule 4(m) [the current federal equivalent of I.R.C.P 
4(b )(2)] an extension is mandatory if good cause is shown and 
discretionary if not. ... For example, plaintiffs repeated but 
unsuccessful efforts to ascertain defendant' s address demonstrates 
diligence in attempting service and wan-ants granting additional 
time to make service .... Even if plaintiff fails to move for an 
extension, the comi may refrain from dismissing defendant from 
the action if plaintiff can demonstrate good cause. Id at § 4.83 
(Emphasis added) 
j\;foore 's treatise then directs to Geller v. Newell, 602 F. Supp 501 , 502 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) 
This case was subject to the now superseded Fed. Rule of Civil Procedure 4U) which has 
language identical to that currently in IRCP 4(b )(2): 
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Unless plaintiffs failure to serve the summons and complaint 
within 120 days was for "good cause", the case must be dismissed 
F.R.Civ.P. 4G); .... The harsh sanction of Rule 4U) is 
appropriate to those cases which no-service was the result of mere 
inadvertence ... While it would be prudent for a plaintiff who will 
be unable to complete service within the statutory period to move 
for an enlargement of time ... prior to the running of the 120 
days, the failure to do so does not mandate dismissal under Rule 
4U). In this case, plaintiff was diligent in his efforts to serve 
defendant and he did, in fact complete service only 14 days after 
the deadline. Defendant has not alleged that he was prejudiced in 
any way by the brief delay. Under these circumstances, dismissal 
was unwarranted. Id. at 502 
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Finally, in Efaw v. Williams, 473 F.3d 1038, 1041 (9th Cir. 2007) the 9th Circuit, in 
application of federal rules for service, held: 
Rule 4(m) provides in part: If service of the summons and 
complaint is not made upon a defendant within 120 days after the 
filing of the complaint, the court, upon motion or on its own 
initiative after notice to the plaintiff, shall dismiss the action 
without prejudice as to the defendant or direct that service be 
effected within a specified time; provided that if Plaintiff shows 
good cause for the failure, the court shall extend the time for 
service for an appropriate period .. .. 
Rule 4(m) ... requires a district court to grant an extension of 
time when the plaintiff shows good cause for the delay .... 
Additionally, the rule permits the district court to grant an 
extension even in the absence of good cause. Id. at 1040 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff asserts that the District Court correctly decided this case on first review. After 
having the oppo1iunity to review the affidavits of Kristen Walker, Attorney McBride, Officer 
Barker and Process Server, Marc Jorgensen, the Court was persuaded that ' good cause ' did exist. 
Only after Defendant filed a Motion for Reconsideration, did the Court encounter some 
difficulty in light of Defendant's skip trace and private investigator ' experiment. ' 
Plaintiff reasserts that the efforts she made constitute due diligence especially regarding 
the circumstance she encountered within six months, including attempts to personally serve at 
Defendant' s declared address before the six month expiration, the subsequent Internet search 
which did not result in a finding of his residence either in Idaho or Nevada, the actual service to 
Defendant's daughter-in-law within the six-month parameters at Defendant's stated address, the 
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attempt to publish the summons and complaint within six months and finally , the subsequent 
petition to the District Court to grant addition time to publish, which was granted. 
Defendant should not be afforded a free pass here. Defendant' s conduct, before and after 
the crash, was in violation of no less than four statutory laws. It constitutes a de facto evasion of 
service of process, all part of an attempt to avoid the payment of bodily injury damages sustained 
by Plaintiff through no fault of her own. 
Plaintiff respectfully requests that the District Court Dismissal be reversed and to declare 
that Defendant was served in a timely fashion, via personal service at his stated address on 
November 2, 2016, (R, p. 44, 54) or by publication with leave of the District Court which was 
completed on February 9, 2017. R, p. 84, 85 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ---1. day of January, 2018. 
MCBRIDE ROBERTS & ROMRELL ATTORNEYS 
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